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Abstract— Cross compliance has been introduced in 
the EU partly to improve compliance with pre-existing 
EU legislation in the Member States. Considerable effort 
has been put into implementing this instrument and the 
corresponding control systems. This presents an 
opportunity to assess factors for an efficient 
enforcement of standards and discuss these with regard 
to cross compliance. The paper characterizes the 
enforcement system connected with cross compliance in 
the EU and implications of interactions with the national 
control systems for specialized legislation. Economic 
theories on mechanisms and the behavior, which form 
the basis of controls, are applied to cross compliance in 
order to draw conclusions on the implementation of 
controls and sanctions. The potential contribution of 
cross compliance to an efficient enforcement of 
mandatory standards is critically discussed. In view of 
the insecure future of direct payments any further 
development of cross compliance within the EU should 
aim at increasing the effectiveness of the enforcement of 
legal standards and strengthen national specialized 
control systems in the long term. 
Keywords— Cross compliance, control theory, 
efficiency 
I. THE CONCEPT OF CROSS COMPLIANCE IN 
THE EU  
The introduction of “cross compliance“ - linking the 
full receipt of direct payments to compliance with 
minimum standards for farming - has been a major 
element of the 2003 reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU, and its 
implementation is since mandatory for all Member 
States. From the recitals of EC Reg. 1782/2003 one 
can deduce the following main objectives connected to 
the implementation of cross compliance:  
•  To strengthen the application and enforcement of 
already existing standards in agriculture due to 
additional systematic controls and the deduction of 
direct payments as a sanction in case of detected 
non-compliance, 
•  To avoid the abandonment of agricultural land and 
ensure that it is kept in good agricultural and 
environmental conditions and to maintain the 
existing area of permanent pasture 
According to the framework given by the EU, 
Member States are obliged to set standards in relation 
to the following three issues.  
•  Farming standards in relation to 19 EU regulations 
and directives (“Statutory management 
requirements” - SMRs, - according to EC 
Reg.1782/2003 Annex III) 
•  “Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions” (GAEC) (EC Reg.1782/2003 Annex 
IV) in terms of soil conservation, minimum 
maintenance of land and retention of landscape 
elements 
•  An obligation on the Member States to maintain 
the proportion of its agricultural area under 
permanent pasture (EC Reg.796/2004) 
Non-compliance of farmers with the requirements 
can result in a cut of direct payments. This mechanism 
of sanctioning is a core element of cross compliance. 
As clear political statements have been made that 
“cross compliance is here to stay” (Fischer Boel, 
Brussels, 29 March 2007), public support in the EU 
will in the future probably be provided with some kind 
of environmental and other conditionalities. Accepting 
this political reality, the question is how to design and 
implement such conditionality mechanisms in an 
efficient way. 
Cross compliance in the EU is connected with 
interactions at different political levels (see figure 1):   2 
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Fig. 1 Interlinkages between EU, Member States and 
farmers 
Cross compliance allows for a system control by the 
EU, if and in what way Member States carry out 
controls of legislation derived from EU law and if 
these are consistent with the requirements aiming at a 
better and more harmonized enforcement. 
Insufficiently implemented procedures can result in 
disallowances, thus deductions of CAP payments 
allocated by the EU to the Member State. This 
mechanism completes infringement procedures before 
the European Court of Justice in case of inadequate 
implementation of EU-Directives in the Member 
States. 
Member States themselves have to set standards 
applicable at farm level with SMRs directly stemming 
from nationally implemented EU legislation and 
standards for GAEC, which may as well encompass 
additional requirements beyond legal standards. Cross 
compliance as an instrument of agri-environmental 
policy thus lies between the national legislation and 
voluntary instruments such as agri-environmental 
measures. Whereas the latter aim at supporting 
desirable management practices via additional 
incentives and are characterized by a voluntary and 
thus limited participation of farmers, cross compliance 
focuses on controls and sanctions to enforce relevant 
standards area-wide [1]. But unlike environmental 
legislation, cross compliance depends on the existence 
of direct payments that are allocated directly to the 
farmer [1][2][3]. As direct payments contribute a 
substantial share of farm income in the EU, as well 
standards beyond previously existing legislation obtain 
a quasi mandatory status via cross compliance [4]. 
The fact, that the EU only defines few concrete 
standards at farm level results in heterogeneous 
standards at the level of Member States even in case of 
SMRs (e.g. implementation of the Nitrates Directive 
can result in the designation of specific nitrate 
vulnerable zones or a nation-wide action program; 
objectives in Natura 2000 areas may be achieved by 
mandatory or voluntary measures). Considerable 
scope for a national implementation of cross 
compliance exists as regards the definition of 
requirements for GAEC, reflecting different priorities 
and conditions in EU Member States [5]. 
Member States are required to establish a system for 
controls and sanctions according to certain EU-
guidelines e.g. concerning control rates and the 
calculation of reductions. They determine which 
administrations to appoint as Competent Control 
Authorities – either various specialized authorities or 
the Paying Agency.  
The implementation of cross compliance in the 
Member States has been influenced by the necessity to 
comply with EU-requirements and considering 
national conditions and priorities, other existing 
instruments, existing administrative procedures and 
farmers’ acceptance. For the effectiveness of cross 
compliance both, the setting of appropriate standards 
and their actual enforcement is crucial. Two general 
strategic approaches for the implementation of cross 
compliance in and within the EU Member States can 
be distinguished [6]: 
•  Cross compliance is used to achieve national 
policy objectives e.g. through the implementation 
of new and ambitious standards within GAEC or 
concerning the protection of grassland. Controls 
are implemented with a view to improve 







–  Sets framework for definition of standards 
and enforcement 
–  Controls Member States upon compliance 
with enforcement procedures 
–  Defines standards and control indicators 
–  Controls farmers upon compliance with standards 
–  In case of insufficient enforcement subject of 
disallowances by EU 
–  Compliance with standards 
–  In case of detected non-compliance 
deduction of direct payments   3 
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•  The implementation of cross compliance is carried 
out formally correct, but using a minimalist 
approach just as far as to comply with EU-
requirements. Standards for GAEC do not impose 
significant challenges for farmers. Limiting the 
administrative burden is in the focus of control 
procedures. 
This paper does not deal with standard setting but 
will further look at the control system connected with 
cross compliance and implications of interactions with 
the national control systems for specialized legislation, 
the key question being, if cross compliance is an 
efficient mechanism to enhance enforcement of 
mandatory standards. Economic theories on 
criminality are used to understand the mechanisms and 
the individual behavior that form the basis of controls. 
If applied to cross compliance, conclusions on the 
implementation of controls and sanctions can be 
drawn. 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS 
A. Basic concepts 
A theory, which touches the issue of compliance 
and control, is the principal-agent theory and the 
problem of „moral hazard“ and „hidden action“. In 
economics, the principal-agent problem treats the 
difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete 
and asymmetric information, which results in losses of 
effectiveness, e.g. when a principal (here: state) tries 
to steer the behavior of an agent (here: farmer). Agents 
may not always comply with given rules (“moral 
hazard”), and the principal does not have full insight 
in the actions of the agents (“hidden action”). The 
interaction between both is assumed to be shaped by 
strategic behavior.  
Two main contrasting concepts related to the 
enforcement of standards can be distinguished [7][8]:  
•  Controls and sanctions aim at minimizing the loss 
of social welfare, which arises through non-
compliance with standards. This can be achieved 
by minimizing the cost generated by such non-
compliance minus the benefits of non-compliance 
and minus cost for control, conviction and 
sanctioning. This concept, which is based on 
Becker [9], implicates the possibility to “buy 
oneself off” by paying a fine. 
•  Awareness of rules and normative and social 
motivations, including moral principles and 
acceptance of reasonable and fair rules, are an 
important precondition for compliance [10]. 
Compliance with standards is expected to be 
higher when the rules are believed to be legitimate 
and fairly applied [11]. Thus, the main objective of 
enforcement mechanisms should be to strengthen 
the trust of citizens in “fair arrangements” and thus 
the legal framework.  
The first viewpoint assumes rational and self-
interested strategic behavior of individuals in order to 
maximize their benefits. The second approach focuses 
on the sense of justice of the actors and the common 
understanding of norms, instead of bringing the 
control and punishment system into perfection. Both, 
strategic behavior and cooperative elements based on 
common moral perceptions should be considered in 
relation to an enforcement of standards. 
While setting appropriate standards with a 
regulative impact, information about and acceptance 
of these requirements is always a precondition of 
effective regulation, administrations resort to different 
types of controls in order to check the behavior of the 
addressees of rules. One can distinguish indirect 
controls (e.g. checking documentation or area size and 
land use by remote sensing) and on-the-spot controls 
with visual inspections of agricultural land, livestock 
or farm buildings and equipment. Controls due to 
suspicion or complaint take place depending on 
necessity, while planned systematic controls are 
carried out as a routine and for a selected control 
sample of farms. The risk analysis for the selection of 
this control sample determines the targeting and 
effectiveness of such a control. Especially concerning 
systematic controls, as they are required for cross 
compliance, the selection of control indicators and   4 
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their dependence from the period and the time of 
controls influences the probability of detection of non-
compliances. While some breaches such as cutting 
down a registered hedge can be detected during a later 
control, some management measures e.g. related to the 
use of fertilizer or plant protection products can often 
only be effectively controlled at the time of the 
application or a little later. The control indicator as 
well influences the legal certainty in case a procedure 
is opened. If the farmer contradicts the accusation, the 
evidence of a breach has to be court-proof. 
B. Enforcement strategies from the state’s perspective 
The control of mandatory standards by the state 
aims at minimizing losses through non-compliance 
with standards, taking into account the administrative 
cost of enforcement. The objective function, which is 
based on Lippert [8], can be outlined in the following 
formula:   
 
f(γ, δ, F) = α [D – (D + F) γ δ] + KS γ        min! (1) 
 
α = Degree of non-compliance (0<= α <=1) 
D = Damage in case of non-compliance for the national 
economy 
F = Penalty in case of established non-compliance (< Fmax) 
γ = Control rate (0<= γ <=1) 
δ = Probability of detection in case of control (0<= δ <=1) 
KS = Public cost for enforcement (control, sanctioning) 
f(γ,δ,F) = Function of control rate, probability of detection 
and height of sanctions 
 
For an effective control system both an abatement 
of  α and preventing breaches with severe 
consequences thus the detection of non-compliances 
of addressees (here: farmers) with high costs for the 
national economy D are important. To achieve an 
optimization, the variables control rate, probability of 
detection and height of sanctions can be varied.  
An increase of control rates is limited by scarce 
administrative resources for controls. The EU 
prescribes a low minimum control rate for systematic 
cross compliance controls, however in case of a high 
percentage of non-compliance the control rate has to 
be increased in the area concerned in the next control 
period. 
Fines accomplish two functions, that are prevention 
and compensation of the damage caused by 
infringements. In case of administrative penalties, the 
sanctions cannot be increased indefinitely, but have to 
take into account the principle of proportionality 
concerning the created damage and the benefits of the 
non-compliance for the addressee. In case of the 
SMRs, which are both covered by legislation and by 
cross compliance, the sanction F is increased by an 
additional deduction of direct payments. Thus, 
regarding cross compliance, the comparably low 
control density is “compensated” by potentially high 
sanctions in order to enforce compliance with 
standards. Further on, keeping back direct payments as 
a sanction is less complicated than enforcing 
administrative penalties. While such an approach is 
possible within cross compliance, as sanctions are 
attached to voluntarily granted support payments, for 
the acceptance of enforcement systems such parallel 
sanctions can be problematic.  
An increased probability of detection in order to 
improve the effectiveness of enforcement while the 
control rate remains constant is another important 
variable. Crucial are the choice of meaningful control 
parameters, a targeted selection of addressees and their 
control at a suitable point of time. This requires 
knowledge about risk factors that are linked to 
increased non-compliance with the relevant standards. 
Also, the severity of damages in case of breaches 
should be considered as part of the selection. 
C. Conditions for a compliance with standards 
It is important to understand the conditions for 
compliance from the view of the addressee (i.e. the 
farmer). With thorough information about standards 
being assumed, the following formula, again derived 
from Lippert [8], illustrates these conditions 
combining benefit-cost calculation of compliance with 
personal moral convictions and considerations on 
social sanctioning (explanation of γ, δ, F see above): 
 
KB – m – r <= γ’ δ’ (F + L) (2) 
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KB = cost of addressee for compliance 
m = Factor for ‚moral considerations‘ of addressee 
r = Factor for risk aversion of addressee 
L = Indirect/social sanctioning 
γ’ = Expected control rate (0<= γ <=1) 
δ’ = Expected probability of detection in case of control 
(0<= δ <=1) 
For an observation of standards the cost for 
compliance, taking into account a factor for moral 
considerations, has to be lower than the expected 
penalties together with the social sanctions in case of 
detected non-compliance. This shows the potentially 
high importance of individual moral considerations 
and of social sanctioning besides strategic behavior 
regarding a maximization of benefits. Thus, a legal 
system for the enforcement of standards should aim to 
bring forward such factors, and avoid the weakening 
of cooperative approaches due to an inappropriate 
treatment of the addressee. Further on, it is noticeable, 
that compliance is not determined through the real 
rates of control and detection, but through the 
individual expectations in this regard. Thus, 
announcing a 10 % control rate, but realizing a 1 % 
rate, would be a rather cheap means to improve 
compliance, while an a priori public commitment to 
low control rates appears unwise. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
Minimum standards are set and enforced in various 
contexts. A difference can be made between controls 
in the framework of CAP support measures such as 
cross compliance, and specialized controls of 
compliance with national or regional legislation.  
A high number of cross compliance requirements 
consists of previously existing legislation (all SMRs, 
some GAEC depending on Member State). This 
special legislation has to be enforced as well 
independently from cross compliance by specialized 
authorities. The introduction of cross compliance 
required the implementation of a parallel control 
system. Both control systems have different 
characteristics (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Comparison of characteristics linked to controls 
within cross compliance and specialized controls 
Cross compliance controls  Specialized controls 
Systematic controls of 1% of 
farms receiving direct payments 
according to EU-framework 
 
Often highly integrated risk 
assessment and bundled 
controls 
 
Focus on indirect indicators 
 
Cross checks can be relevant 
 
Sanctions according to severity 
of breach, but as well depending 
on the height of direct payments 
Controls according to national 
and regional rules (control rate 
can be higher, but partly few or 
no systematic controls) 
 
Control by specialist authority 
 
Control of limited number of 
standards 
 
Includes controls due to 
complaint or suspicion 
 
Administrative penalty oriented 
at principle of proportionality 
 
A. Systematic controls within cross compliance 
Cross compliance requirements have to be checked 
during systematic on-the-spot controls according to 
the EU framework. Inspections take place regularly 
for a defined percentage of farms (1  % as a rule), 
selected through risk-assessment. Notably, this 
minimum control rate can be understood as part of the 
EU’s goal “cutting red tape” (lightening administrative 
burden), thus opportunities for a more strategic 
approach of keeping control rates intransparent have 
been missed. With such a low control rate, the choice 
of control indicators and the type of risk analysis for 
the selection of farms to be controlled is indispensable 
for an effective control. 
The prescriptions of the EU for a bundled control of 
all standards a Competent Control Authority is 
responsible for, results in a dilemma for the Member 
States. They have the option on the one hand to 
employ only few control authorities, and thus have a 
rather low administrative effort for coordination, and 
carry out an integrated risk assessment over a high 
number of standards for one control group. On the 
other hand a selection targeted to high risk-farms 
according to single cross compliance requirements 
involves a higher number of different control 
authorities and increases the overall control rate. In 
cases where only the paying agency or very few 
Competent Control Authorities exist, a wide variety of 
standards has to be controlled in the same control   6 
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sample. In this case farms are being controlled for 
many requirements, which have not been the reason 
for their selection, and for which they might not 
present a significant risk. Additionally, in case of 
farms being chosen out of the control sample for 
inspection of the general eligibility for direct 
payments, these are preselected according to general 
risk factors related to support rules and not to the 
various standards to be controlled. According to a 
report from the Commission on the implementation of 
cross compliance, Member States have in many cases 
only used few specific risk criteria for the selection so 
far even if more information had been available [12]. 
Control indicators have to be accessible during a 
systematic control thus being independent from the 
time of the visit and easy to verify (even more so when 
inspectors are not coming from a specialized authority 
and have to assess standards in a variety of areas). On 
the other hand such criteria are often not directly 
meaningful in terms of the real environmental impact. 
The systematic cross compliance controls often rely 
heavily on such indirect indicators.  
Any non-compliance with relevant standards, 
detected as a consequence of other kinds of checks or 
that come to the attention of the Competent Control 
Authority in any other way can result in sanctions 
according to cross compliance. The relevance of such 
so-called “cross checks” depends on the effectiveness 
of the specialized control system in the different 
Member States and the information exchange and 
cooperation between the different control authorities. 
Cross checks are highly relevant in creating a level 
playing field between Member States. 
Although the percentage of payment reductions 
depends on the severity of a breach, the absolute 
amount of the sanction is based on the height of direct 
payments and thus the link to damages in case of 
infringements or to the cost of compliance is weaker 
than in case of administrative penalties. 
B. Characteristics of the specialized control system 
Within the specialized control system controls take 
place according to national or regional rules 
concerning control rates and the choice of farms. They 
are generally carried out by various specialized 
agencies and concentrate on a limited number of 
standards. Thus, farms can be selected in a more 
targeted way concentrating on high-risk farms and 
vulnerable areas. Besides systematic controls, 
suspicions or complaints can be taken into account for 
spontaneous checks. Thus, as well control indicators 
that are dependent on the time of controls (e.g. 
compliance with time bans or distances for fertilizer 
application) can be applied. Still, control rates vary 
considerably, and not always are systematic controls 
in place. However, as no EU-wide reporting on 
national specialized controls is required, there is a lack 
of transparency on how exactly Member States carry 
out specialized controls.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
One can assume that it is a high interest of Member 
States to comply with EU-requirements related to 
cross compliance in order not to risk disallowances. 
This does not encourage an ambitious implementation 
either of standards or control procedures within cross 
compliance, implying the danger of considerable 
bureaucratic effort with little impact – and thus of 
inefficient use of scarce financial and administrative 
resources.  
EU requirements result in a strong tendency for an 
integrated risk assessment and bundled systematic 
controls. Where no effective control system related to 
the SMRs has been established before, cross 
compliance practically introduces EU-wide minimum 
standards for systematic controls of existing 
mandatory standards and undoubtedly means an 
improvement of enforcement. As well, the structured 
procedures for cross compliance can yield in expertise 
for an optimization of the enforcement of specialized 
legislation. 
Where relevant specialized legislation has already 
been controlled systematically, cross compliance 
results in additional controls and co-ordination 
between authorities, but not necessarily in any added 
value [5]. In the light of limited administrative 
resources the implementation of controls in the 
framework of cross compliance can even be an 
incentive to cut back or simplify the specialized 
control system. A possible replacement of specialized 
controls partly by highly bundled cross compliance 
controls might result in more systematic but less 
targeted controls. In cases where specialized controls   7 
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had been carried out in a more targeted way before, 
this would mean a weakening of such controls. 
However, it is very likely that cross compliance has 
contributed to a higher awareness level concerning 
mandatory standards, due to the threat of higher 
sanctions. The distribution of information in the 
course of the introduction of cross compliance and the 
activities around the accompanying farm advisory 
system have apparently been helpful as well in this 
respect [5].  
As long as direct payments exist, obligatory cross 
compliance will presumably remain a feature of the 
CAP, and in the short- and medium-term the 
enforcement of mandatory standards can be supported 
by this additional instrument. However, the impact of 
cross compliance always depends on the amount of the 
financial incentive. If direct payments are reduced, 
which is likely in the long term, the importance of 
cross compliance will decrease [1][3][13]. Thus, an 
effective enforcement of mandatory standards as well 
independently of cross compliance remains crucial. 
While standards related to the agricultural area 
(GAEC) are in line with area-related direct payments, 
the inclusion of SMRs in the control system of cross 
compliance can be questioned, considering the 
potentially double control system and the risk of 
focussing on systematic controls in the framework of 
cross compliance rather than on optimizing the 
specialized control system. An interesting example is 
provided by Switzerland, where compliance with 
certain pre-existing legislation for water, environment 
and nature protection is a prerequisite for the reception 
of direct payments, but not part of the control system 
within cross compliance, which itself is focused on 
animal welfare and rather ambitious standards for land 
management such as Integrated Production or 
ecological compensation areas [14].  
In view of the insecure future of direct payments as 
well as the European Commission’s activity on “Better 
Regulation” any further development of cross 
compliance within the EU should aim at increasing the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of standards, that is 
to target high risk farms and to prevent especially 
breaches with potentially severe consequences, and at 
the same time strengthen specialized control systems 
with such characteristics. In order to sustain existing 
efforts of Member States in this respect, regular 
specialized controls should be taken into account for 
the control rates for cross compliance, rather than 
replacing them with systematic cross compliance 
controls. This would however require EU-wide 
minimum standards for specialized controls (e.g. 
selection of farms through risk assessment). A more 
systematic integration of cross checks into control and 
enforcement of cross compliance and respective 
documentation and reporting would be a step forward 
in this regard. 
The theoretical considerations above show as well 
that the legal system for the enforcement of standards 
should strengthen moral considerations, a precondition 
for this being an enforcement system perceived as 
“fair”. Highly integrated systematic controls with a 
low control rate but potentially high sanctions may be 
problematic in this respect. Answers on a 
questionnaire on cross compliance by 184 German 
farmers point in the same direction and indicate a 
higher acceptance of selecting high-risk farms and 
targeted controls of requirements that are really 
relevant on their farms and where breaches could have 
potentially severe effects, than being controlled 
according to broad checklists as well on seemingly 
“irrelevant” standards. Further on, sufficient 
information about the standards is a precondition for 
compliance, understanding and cooperation. A high 
transparency is demanded in this respect. 
Empirical analyses of control procedures are limited 
due to a lack of data, be it through strategic behavior 
of addressees, confidentiality of data or a hesitation to 
make information on controls and sanctions available. 
However, as a basis for an extensive evaluation and 
for any optimization of systems for the enforcement of 
standards such analyses would be highly desirable. 
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